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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the stock price behaviour of firms 
listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) around corporate events 
relating to final cash dividend change announcements over the period 2004 to 
2009. Declared for the financial year-end, final cash dividend announcements 
either represent an increase, a reduction or no change relative to the previous 
year’s announcement. In this paper we analyse the stock price behaviour of 
firms that announced dividend reductions before and during the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007 (GFC 2007). The pre-crisis analysis focuses on 
dividend reduction effects on share price during normal economic times and 
crisis analysis focuses on effects during economic downturn. We refer to the 
pre and during crises effects as firm-specific and systemic effects respectively. 
Studies about the general effect of dividend announcements on shareholder 
value are well documented; however our study is motivated by the fact that 
there has not been an abundance of forthcoming research in South Africa 
pertaining to how share prices have reacted to dividend reductions before and 
during the GFC 2007. We employ an event study methodology in the context of 
this emerging market to assess the share price behaviour to dividend 
reductions. Integral to an event study methodology in the corporate context, is 
the analysis of abnormal performance around the event date. Abnormal 
performance is measured by employing three widely used quantitative 
approaches namely, the market-adjusted, market model and the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return approaches. Based on daily closing share price information 
collected from iNet Bridge database, abnormal performance is calculated from 
2004 to 2009 while controlling for the contemporaneous effect of earnings 
announcements (earnings data collected from Bloomberg database) occurring 
within 10 trading days of dividend announcement. The analysis shows that the 
market reaction is not statistically significant on the announcement day and that 
more negative returns occur during the pre-crisis period. Volatility of abnormal 
returns is higher during the pre-crisis period. The research does not support the 
Irrelevance Theory but seems to support the signalling hypothesis. 
Keywords: Johannesburg Securities Exchange, Final Cash Dividend, Global Financial Crisis, 
Firm-Specific Effects, Systemic Effects, Abnormal Performance, Market Adjusted 
Abnormal Return, Market Model Abnormal Return, Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this research is to analyse the stock price reaction of firms listed 
on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) to dividend reductions or 
suspensions over the period 2004 to 2009. This period of analysis was chosen 
such that it consists of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 (GFC 2007) period. 
The objective is to assess the market reaction to dividend reductions before and 
during the GFC 2007. The pre-crisis analysis endeavours to assess stock price 
reaction to dividend changes that are made or announced during normal 
economic conditions (firm-specific effects) while the crisis analysis aims to 
gauge the systemic effects of dividend changes. Literature on share price 
reactions to dividend announcements is abundant in South Africa, however 
since GFC 2007, not much literature has been forthcoming assessing the share 
price reaction to dividend reductions or suspension during the downturn. This 
event study analysis therefore presents an opportunity to test theories and 
hypothesis relating to corporate dividend policy e.g. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
Dividend Irrelevance Theory and Signalling Hypothesis - Bhattacharya (1979), 
over the period of study. This paper is amongst the first to gauge the behaviour 
of firms’ stock prices around corporate dividend events before and during GFC 
2007 in South Africa. 
1.2 Context of the study 
The topic about corporate dividend policy is an important subject in the field of 
corporate finance and there has been ongoing research on whether dividend 
policy matters. At the centre of dividend policy is the question of whether firms 
would always pay dividend or retain earnings to invest in positive net present 
value projects for its shareholders (Firer, et al., 2008). Dividends are by 
definition, the portion of a company’s earnings, decided by the board of 
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directors, distributed to the shareholders. There are various forms of corporate 
actions pertaining to dividend announcements made by firms listed on the JSE 
exchange and these are classified into three broad categories namely, final, 
interim and preliminary. To illustrate the magnitude of the cash outlay 
associated with dividend payout, in 2006, JSE companies paid around R110 
billion in dividends to their shareholders (Firer, et al., 2008). However, there are 
other schools of research that have developed and proven theories suggesting 
that dividend policy does not matter e.g. dividend irrelevance theory (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1961). Most of these studies conclude that their empirical analyses 
support the dividend irrelevance theory. In the context of the South African 
market i.e. the JSE, it has also been shown that dividend irrelevance theory 
holds. However, research on what was the effect of cut in dividends on the 
share price or the market as a whole during the crisis is limited. Most of the 
research that has been done for emerging (including South Africa) and 
developed markets, focussed primarily at analysing the declaration effects on 
shareholder value. The JSE exchange is ranked as one of the top 20 
exchanges in the world by market capitalisation. The majority of this market 
capitalisation is attributable to the companies listed on the Main Board which 
also consists of the listings of the top 40 stocks. There are approximately 340 
shares listed on the JSE Main Board which houses the same sectors grouped 
according to the London Stock Exchange (www.jse.co.za).   
1.3 Problem statement 
1.3.1 Main Problem 
To analyse and interpret results of the firm’s stock price behaviour around 
corporate dividend relating to dividend reductions over the period 2004 to 2009. 
The analysis is conducted on the JSE listed firms.  
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1.3.2 Sub-problems 
• To compare the severity of market reaction to dividend cuts before and 
during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007. 
• To test for the abnormal return significance using event study metrics of 
average and cumulative abnormal returns 
• To deduce whether the South African market (emerging market) supports 
the informational content of dividend hypothesis and whether the study is 
in line with other emerging market or international studies 
• To recommend future areas of study on this topical issue relating to 
corporate dividend policy in South Africa 
1.4 Research questions 
The financial market impact of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 was 
catastrophic. A large number of “too large to fail” financial institutions either 
failed or were rescued by governments during the crisis.  In order to circumvent 
the likelihood of failure, some institutions took decisions relating to distribution 
of earnings in the form of dividends. Instead, they cut back or suspended 
dividends. Below are some of the questions that the report will address: 
• There has not been a lot of research conducted on the JSE exchange 
since the subprime mortgage crisis, pertaining to how the market reacted 
during the crisis to announcements of dividend cuts or suspensions. How 
has the market responded to such decisions and what happened to the 
share prices of companies that announced dividend cuts or suspended 
dividends? 
• For comparative purposes, does the market react more to dividend cuts 
or suspensions if such decisions are made during a crisis period or 
during normal economic periods? 
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• Does the dividend payment or announcement impact on share price 
support any of the hypotheses such as irrelevance theory? Did the 
announcement of dividend cuts or suspension have a signalling effect 
about the underlying firm’s future earnings’ prospects during the crisis? 
• Since dividend policy differs from company to company and the majority 
of JSE-listed companies follow a constant dividend payout policy, will the 
effect dividend payment have a significant effect on share price? 
1.5 Significance of the study 
• The study fills a gap in that literature on the “South African market 
reaction to dividend reductions or suspensions pre and during financial 
crisis” is not abundant  
• The study establishes, in the context of JSE, whether markets react more 
to dividend cuts or suspensions if made during a financial crisis or normal 
economic phase  
• The study provides an opportunity to test some of the theories developed 
in academia on the domestic market e.g. does evidence from the JSE 
support the Miller and Modigliani (1961) hypothesis of dividend 
irrelevancy 
1.6 Delimitations of the study 
The research only covers the sample of shares listed on the JSE Main Board 
that announced dividends cuts over the chosen period of study. Furthermore, 
since there are various basic types of dividends announced by JSE listed firms 
e.g. extra dividends, special dividends and liquidating dividends (Firer et al 
2008), the report only focuses on regular cash dividend. We also control for 
confounding earnings effect resulting from the joint announcement of earnings 
and dividends. Selection criteria is discussed later in the research. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides literature review pertaining to dividends and is structured 
as follows. Discussion of dividend policy theory is provided in section 2.2. This 
is followed in section 2.3 by a discussion of literature on dividend payment 
effect on shareholder wealth, and provides an overview of some of the 
international studies conducted. Section 2.4 provides a detailed overview of 
studies conducted in emerging markets including South Africa. The last section 
articulates the main issue relating to dividend cuts or suspension. 
2.2 Dividend policy 
At the heart of dividend policy is the question of whether the firm would always 
pay dividend or retain earnings to invest in positive net present value projects. 
There are however, schools of research that have developed and proven 
theories suggesting that dividend policy does not matter e.g. dividend 
irrelevance theory (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Several studies conducted on 
the effect of dividend policy on share prices have supported the dividend 
irrelevance theory. There is an abundance of literature pertaining to the topic of 
dividend policy effects on the share price. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
concluded that dividend payments should have no impact on shareholder value 
in the absence of taxes and market imperfections. This algebraically derived 
theory is well-known in academia as the Dividend Irrelevance Theory. The 
implication of this is that firms should instead be focussing on investing earnings 
in value-adding i.e. positive net present value projects, instead of paying them 
out to shareholders in the form of dividends. There are also theories around tax 
preferences of shareholders. The Gordon Growth Model (1959) postulates that 
the value of the share price is the present value of future expected dividends. 
Some hypotheses in academic literature suggest that firms pay dividends to 
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signal future earnings prospects of the companies. This signal is called the 
information content effect of dividend (Firer et al., 2008).  
2.3 Dividend payment effect on share price 
Despite literature pertaining to dividend policies, stock market data shows that 
firms do pay dividends. In a recent international study of why firms pay 
dividends, it was found that there is little evidence of a positive systematic 
relationship between dividend payments and prices for countries outside the US 
(Denis and Osobov 2007). The findings of the report cast doubt on signalling, 
clientele effect, catering explanations for dividends and supported agency cost-
based lifecycle theories. Dividends as mentioned are paid out of earnings and 
while on the contention of information content of dividends i.e. whether 
dividends signal more earnings or future firm’s earnings prospects, (Araujo et al 
2004) took a mathematical approach involving equilibrium models to illustrate 
that dividends have an informational content about a firms future earnings 
prospects. However, their dividend signalling model indicated that firms with low 
earnings may pay high dividends to be considered as high-earning firms. Fuller 
and Goldstein (2003) showed that dividend paying firms have higher returns 
than non-dividend paying firms especially during recessions. This was tested on 
the S&P 500 stocks.  It is in the light of this that this report reviews literature 
pertaining to various studies that have been conducted on this topic and more 
specifically to assess the impact on the share price if companies cut back or 
suspended dividends in the face of financial crisis.  
2.4 Emerging market studies 
2.4.1 South Africa 
Sealy and Knight (1987) documented two empirical studies on the JSE aimed at 
assessing the systematic effect of a firm’s dividend policy on its share price. 
They used methods entailing dividend groupings based on payout ratios and 
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dividend yields and the market model. Their tests revealed that firms’ dividend 
policies do not appear to affect the price of the securities. Another recent study 
performed on the JSE assessed whether the dividend payments can be 
explained using Lintner’s model derived in the 1950s (Wolmarans 2003). The 
findings of this research illustrate that the model does not explain the payments 
in the South African context largely due to data issues. Some entities on the 
JSE had not been listed for a sufficient period of time while other companies 
followed a constant payout dividend policy. Ravi and Sirikiat (2007) mention that 
dividend signal is complete or effective when it is measured in terms of surprise 
from financial analysts’ forecast rather than a surprise from an already paid 
dividend. Consequently they conclude based on their empirical analysis that 
stock prices react to dividend surprises.  Another research done in the context 
of the South African market, is by Bhana (1998) where the share price reaction 
to special (extra) dividend announcement is investigated. The research shows 
that share prices on the JSE react positively to the announcement of special 
dividends. It is not expected that most companies make special dividends 
hence the report focuses largely on final cash dividend payments.  
2.4.2 Other markets 
Studies in other markets have also been performed in this field; Uddin (2003) 
study on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) focussed on the analysis of 
announcement effects of dividends on the shareholder value. The paper chose 
this approach after having reviewed other alternatives with the hope that 
announcement of dividend payments may carry some information for the market 
and share prices may adjust to this accordingly. However, having applied what 
appears to be commonly used methodologies (to be discussed later) on 137 
shares listed on the DSE, the paper concluded that evidence from DSE tends to 
support the dividend irrelevance theory.  
Moving on to the Indian market, Azhagaiah and Sabari (2008) analysed the 
impact of dividend policy on shareholder wealth in specific industries. Their 
research approach entailed multiple and stepwise regression methodologies 
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taking dividend per share, retained earnings per share, lagged dividend/market 
price per share as explanatory variables and market price per share as the 
response variable. In a nutshell, their methodology tested whether any of the 
explanatory variables explained the variability in the share price but with more 
focus on the dividend per share impact on the share price. Their study showed 
that there is a significant impact of dividend policy on shareholder value and 
thus nullified the dividend irrelevance theory.  
Travlos et al (2001) tested the announcement effect in the case of Cyprus. The 
empirical results of their research were in favour of the information signalling 
contention. The studies conducted in this market should be of interest to the 
JSE since the Cyprus market is also an emerging stock market. Various tests 
have been conducted on developed market. However the approach used in the 
analysis is similar to the approach discussed in the research methodology for 
the JSE listed entities. The paper asserts that due to market microstructure and 
different information, tax and control environments, the impact of dividend 
changes is likely to vary across economic environments in different countries.  
Thirumalvalavan and Sunitha (2006) studied the developments in the Indian 
market; Pradhan (2003) studied the effect of dividends and retained earnings on 
common stock prices in the context of Nepalese companies. The study revealed 
that dividends were important in Nepal than retained earnings as they increased 
the market price of a share in Nepal.  
The case for the Greek stock market as discussed by Dasilas (2004) focused 
on the stock price and trading volume sensitivity to dividend distribution 
announcements. The study documents that there is a significant market 
reaction to announcements which effectively supports the information content of 
dividends hypothesis. This paper also uses the abnormal return methods which 
examines the market-adjusted abnormal returns. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Firer et al (2008) highlight the De Beers’ share price reaction to dividend 
reductions in different periods. The study postulates that share price may or 
may not react to dividend changes. Below is an extract that explains this 
phenomenon: 
“When De Beers, the world’s major diamond producer, announced in 1982 that 
it had for the first time in 50 years cut its final dividend (by 50 per cent), its share 
price fell by 13 per cent in week after the announcement. However a decade 
later, when it cut its final dividend for 1992 by nearly 30 per cent, the share price 
traded unchanged over the week that followed.” 
The primary focus of the report is to assess what happened to the share price of 
those companies that cut back dividends as a result of the financial crisis. 
Clearly from the above, share price could react or not react on the news of a 
cut. Based on the share valuation theory, share price is equal to the net present 
value of future dividends (the Gordon Growth Model). On that view, one can 
immediately suspect that dividend cut is likely to hurt the share price unless the 
company can compellingly persuade shareholders that there will be an 
offsetting, larger dividend increase in the future. However, this model of pricing 
equities has its shortcomings as evidenced from the technology sector. This 
sector has shown that companies can grow in share price and size more or less 
indefinitely without paying any dividends at all. One of the cited reasons for 
dividend cuts is a change in economic environment in which the company is 
incorporated whereby the companies’ cash flows are diminishing (the cash flow 
hypothesis). This is one of the warning signals associated with the financial 
crisis. Kalay (1980) examined the empirical evidence on dividend cuts and 
found it to be inconclusive. The study also investigates the informational content 
of dividend cuts and finds that dividend cuts do have informational content. 
While some investors may look at a dividend cut and decide that the company 
management is simply responding appropriately to changing business 
conditions, the historical evidence indicates that the stock price is likely to suffer 
upon news of a dividend cut.  
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Chapter 3: Research methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodology employed to address the 
research problem and questions in this study and is structured as follows: 
section 3.2 discusses data and sources thereof. Section 3.3 presents an 
overview of the different types of dividend announcements made in South Africa 
and discusses briefly the type of dividend that the research focuses on. The 
final sample selection criterion is provided in section 3.4, followed by an in-
depth technical description of the research design in section 3.5. 
3.2 Data and sources 
For this event study research, daily closing share price and dividend 
announcements data were collected from iNet datastream over the time period 
1 January 2004 to 31 December 2009. The use of daily rather than monthly 
share price data permits more precise measurement of abnormal returns and 
more informative studies of announcement effect (Khotari and Warner, 2006). 
The dividend announcement data provides information about the very first 
official date, the executive of a firm declared the dividend. The corporate 
practice in South Africa regarding dividend and earnings announcements is 
suspected to be such that both events are announced jointly. If this joint effect 
of earnings and dividend announcement is not controlled for, there will be a 
potential for abnormal return distortion. It was as a result of this relation that 
information on earnings announcement date, a separate event from dividend 
announcement date, was collected from Bloomberg database over the period 
2004 to 2009. Dasilas (2004) posits that the effect of joint dividend and earnings 
announcement should be controlled for i.e. earnings announcement is one of 
the confounding factors that must be controlled for when analysing dividend 
effect on share prices. Kane, Lee and Marcus (1985) showed that there is a 
corroborative relationship between dividend and earnings announcement. 
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Therefore, abnormal return performance may be distorted if the two 
announcements are not separated. To circumvent this contagion effect, Dasilas 
(2004) mention that only dividend announcements that have no corporate 
events that can distort results 10 days prior and post the announcement should 
be considered. The following section describes different types of dividend 
announcements made by companies listed on the JSE. 
3.3 Dividend types 
The dividend announcement data as described in the section 3.2 is drawn for 
companies listed on the JSE exchange over the period 2004 to 2009. Each data 
point has the following fields: (a) announcement date (event date); (b) 
announcement type (various forms described in this section); (c) financial year 
end; (d) last date of record (LDR); (e) payment date, and (f) dividend per share, 
expressed in South African cents (ZAC). Table 1 exhibits different types of JSE 
corporate actions pertaining to dividends. A corporate action is any event which 
has a material effect on the share price or a shareholder’s right (JSE). The 
abbreviations are in line with iNet dividend database. A brief description of each 
event type is provided in the last column. 
Table 1: JSE corporate actions definition 
Overview of Announcement Types 
Dividend type Abbreviation Description 
Final Capital 
Issue FA 
Free issue of shares to all existing shareholders for the financial 
year-end. Also called bonus issue (company feels free to convert 
part of its reserves into new shares) 
Final Cash FC 
Dividend declared for the financial year-end where an issuer 
distributes reserves in cash only to the registered owners (and 
where applicable for the benefit of beneficial owners).  
Interim Capital 
Issue IA 
Free issue of shares to all existing shareholders for the financial 
year-end. Also called bonus issue (company feels free to convert 
part of its reserves into new shares) 
Interim Cash IC 
Dividend paid after a reporting period where an issuer 
distributes reserves in cash only to the registered owners (and 
where applicable for the benefit of beneficial owners).  
Special Cash SC Dividend declared for the interim or financial year-end, over and 
above the normal dividend 
Special Script SS 
A process of creating new shares which are given free of charge 
to existing shareholders normally done in lieu of cash dividend. 
Scrip dividends generally signal that a firm is short of cash. 
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Other Types 
FO Final Option 
FP Final Proforma 
IO Interim Dollar 
IP Interim Option 
IQ Interim Proforma 
SO Special Option 
The research focuses on final cash dividend (FC) announcements only. Section 
3.4 summarises the sample selection criteria. 
3.4 Sample selection criteria 
To be included in the final sample, JSE listed companies should meet the 
following criteria which is commonly used in other event studies such as Asquith 
and Mullins (1983), Vieira and Raposo (2000); Dasilas (2004): (a) company 
earnings announcements or other factors that may distort the analysis e.g. 
stock splits, stock dividends, share repurchases etc, did not occur within 10 
trading days before and after the dividend announcement; (b) the company has 
dividend payment history which entails the ordinary final cash dividend payment 
in the current and previous year. This criterion is important for the calculation of 
dividend changes from year to year; (c) the firm is listed on the JSE exchange 
the year before and two years after the dividend events. This criterion controls 
for de-listings from one year to the next and thus minimizes the survivorship 
bias; (d) interim and stock dividends are not announced during the event 
window. This is defined in the next section as 20 days before and after the 
dividend announcement date, i.e. 41-day event window, and (e) the firm should 
have price data over the 100 day estimation window. 
To control for confounding effects of earnings announcements within 10 trading 
days of dividend announcements, earnings data was collected from Bloomberg 
database. The total number of firms that announced final cash dividends over 
the period of study is 307 (1701 announcements). For each firm, earnings 
announcement date associated with each dividend event was collected. 
However, Bloomberg data was available for only 207 of the 307 companies. 
This resulted in 1163 total number of dividend events after adjusting for the 
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missing earnings data. Table 2 reports the number of dividend events (after 
adjusting for missing Bloomberg data) classified by sample selection criteria 
and number of dividend events over the period of study. 
Table 2: Sample selection criteria 
Selection criteria No. of events (no. of firms) 
Total number of final cash dividend announcements 1701 (307) 
  
Total number of dividend events after adjusting for 
missing earnings data 1163 (207) 
  
Dividend events which earnings announcements occurs 
within 10 trading days of dividend change 
announcement 
216 
  
Dividend events which earnings announcements are 
made on the same day as dividend announcements 698 
  
Total excluded dividend events 914 
Total number of dividend events for analysis 249 (128) 
Figures in parentheses show number of firms 
For this analysis, all cases that had earnings announcements made within 10 
trading days of dividend announcement were excluded. Approximately 19% of 
dividend events, with the exclusion of joint announcements, occur within 10 
trading days of dividend announcements. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that 60% 
of earnings and dividends events are announced jointly for the JSE listed 
companies. This resulted in 79% of events being excluded from the analysis. 
Applying the above sample selection criteria resulted in an unbalanced panel 
data of 249 events across 128 companies. Table 3 reports the JSE sectors for 
the companies in the final sample. Overall, it can be seen that the final sample 
is made up of companies from all sectors on the JSE which are classified 
according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). Figure 1 shows the 
distribution per sector with the majority of companies belonging to the financial 
services category.  
 Table 3: Final sample company sector allocation
Figure 1: Sector allocation distribution
Sector
Financial Services
Basic Resources
Industrial Goods & Services
Retail
Construction & Materials
Technology
Food & Beverage
Travel & Leisure
Media
Real Estate
Banks
Chemicals
Insurance
AltX
Personal & Household Goods
Food & Drug Retailers
Health Care
Telecommunications
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No of companies % of companies
31 24.22%
14 10.94%
11 8.59%
11 8.59%
9 7.03%
8 6.25%
6 4.69%
6 4.69%
5 3.91%
5 3.91%
4 3.13%
4 3.13%
4 3.13%
4 3.13%
3 2.34%
1 0.78%
1 0.78%
1 0.78%
128
All dividends (N=249)
JSE ICB Sector Allocation
 
 
100%
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3.5 Research design 
3.5.1 Event study overview 
This section describes methods used to calculate abnormal performance 
around an event date with a special focus on the design and statistical 
properties of event study methods. By definition, event studies assess the stock 
price reaction or behaviour around corporate events. In the context of this 
research, the corporate event of interest is dividend reduction. Of particular 
interest is the assessment abnormal performance magnitude around the event 
date. The following commonly used abnormal return measurement approaches 
are employed in this research:   
• Market Adjusted Abnormal Return (MAAR) 
• Market Model Abnormal Return (MMAR) 
• Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
Before describing the above measures, it is important to define stages of an 
event study as documented by Khotari and Warner (2006), Hirvonen (2009) and 
Thiagarajan and McDonald (2001). Stages of an event study entail the following 
steps: 
• Define event to be tested 
• Define period to be studied in terms of estimation window, event window 
and event date 
• Define what is meant by abnormal performance 
• Collect event data which meets data selection criteria already defined 
• Calculate pre-event abnormal returns 
• Calculate abnormal returns over the event window 
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• Calculate the average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for the test statistic 
• Determine the critical values (statistical significance) of the AAR and 
CAR 
• Analyse and interpret the results 
Figure 2 shows the timeline for abnormal performance measurement. Key 
aspects of the performance timeline are the estimation window, event window 
and event date.  
Figure 2: Abnormal performance timeline 
 
The estimation window consists of 100 trading days. This period is used for the 
calculation of unbiased estimate of firm’s performance in the absence of the 
event. Expressed differently, the estimation period is important for establishing 
how the stock returns behave in the absence of the event (Hirvonen 2009). For 
the MMAR approach, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) approach to quantify 
regression parameters to be used to estimate abnormal performance in the 
event window. The event window period defines the number of trading days 
before and after event. In this study, we study firm’s share price behaviour 20 
days before and after the event date (day 0). Event window period is important 
as it shows how long the market takes to adjust to new information; in this case 
market’s reaction to corporate events relating to final cash dividend change 
announcement. Section 3.5.2 presents the dividend change model. 
3.5.2 Dividend change model 
The general focus of this research is on firm’s stock price reaction to dividend 
changes. This section presents a simple model for decomposing dividend 
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events into decreases, increases or no change announcements. The dividend 
change model is therefore described by three formulaic expressions outlined 
below: 
A dividend change is considered constant if the following holds: 
,  ,                                                             	1 
where 
, is the firm  current final cash dividend and , is the previous year’s final 
cash dividend.  
A dividend increase is recorded if the following holds: 
,  ,                                                             	2 
A dividend reduction is recorded if the following holds: 
,  ,                                                             	3 
Application of the dividend change model is illustrated in Section 4.3 where the 
final unbalanced panel data of 249 events described in Section 3.4 (Table 2) is 
decomposed into dividend changes. 
The next section provides a mathematical description of each abnormal 
performance measurement approach introduced in Section 3.5.1. Market 
adjusted abnormal return (MAAR) approach is described first, followed by 
market model abnormal return (MMAR) approach and lastly, market adjusted 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach is described.  
3.5.3 Abnormal return calculation approaches 
Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between actual returns and 
expected returns. Therefore, the generalized form of abnormal return formula 
for all expected return models is: 
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,  ,  ,                             	4 
where, 
,    !"  #  $ $ !   %& , '   ( 	20;+20  
 ,   ,#"  #  $ $ !   %& , '   ( 	20;+20  
,   -.,%  #   $ !   %& , '   ( 	20;+20   
Market Adjusted Abnormal Return 
The first model of abnormal returns we discuss is the Market-Adjusted 
Abnormal Return (MAAR). In functional form, this is the simplest model. 
Equation 5 below shows how MAAR is calculated: 
/,  ,  0,                         	5 
where 
/,   ! 2 %3#%  !"  #  $ $ !   %&    4 '%'  
0,   56 7681  #   %&  '  4 '%' 
Equation 5 posits that the expected return on a firm’s stock price over the event 
window can be predicted by the return of the market (JSE ALSI) over the same 
period (Thiagarajan and McDonald 2001). From modern portfolio theory, 
Equation 5 is the Jensen’s alpha, a measure of active return or outperformance. 
                                            
1
 All Share Index 
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Market Model Abnormal Return 
The market model abnormal return (MMAR) entails applying the single-index 
market model to calculate expected returns as shown by Equation 6 below: 
, 9+ :0,                       	6 
Regression coefficients are calculated over the 100-day estimation window (-
120, 21) by regressing share price return against the market index return as 
follows: 
, 9+ :0, + <                    	7 
where  
:  >?@	AB,C,AD,C EF	AB,C                             	8 
Therefore the market model abnormal return (MMAR) is computed as follows:              
                   //,  ,  9HI+ :HJ0,                	9 
Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return 
Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for the dividend events are calculated for 
different periods as follows: 
LM 	N ? O  P1 + , P	1 + 0,
QO
QN
QO
QN
             	10 
where 
LM 	N ? O is the buy and hold abnormal return for share  from time a to b. 
Stock price return calculation 
For all the aforementioned models, returns are calculated by employing natural 
logarithm of the stock market prices as follows: 
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,  ln b c,c,d ; 0,  ln b
c0,c0,d                      	11 
where, 
c/0,  stock price/market  price on day t  
c/0,  stock or market price on day t  1,  
/0,  "i !,  #  $  ,2 . ,   ! 2 . ,  %&   
3.6 Metrics used to test abnormal returns 
The metrics used to measure and test the abnormal return significance are, 
average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR). These 
are applied to the three approaches for calculating abnormal returns within the 
event window, MAAR, MMAR and BHAR. We now describe AAR and CAR 
measurements.  
3.6.1 Average Abnormal Return 
The average abnormal returns for a 41 day-event window (-20, +20) is 
calculated as follows: 
jk  ∑ j,
mCQn       	12  
where, 
jk  4 i  !"  #   %& , '   ( 	20,20 % j 
( 	/,//, LM 
j,   !"  #  $ $ !   %&  '   ( 	20,20 %  j (
	/,//, LM  
n   #!  $ %4%% 4  %& , '   ( 	20,20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For example, to calculate average abnormal returns for MMAR, formulaic 
expression of equation 12 becomes: 
//oooooooooo  ∑ //,
mCQ n    
3.6.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Cumulative abnormal returns for all abnormal return types for various event 
windows around the announcement date as follows: 
p	, q  r s
F
Qt
                  	13 
where 
s  ( 	/oooooooooo,//oooooooooo, LMooooooooo 
3.6.3 Event study tests 
To test the significance of the abnormal returns around the event date, the 
following hypothesis test (for dividend increases, decreases and no change) is 
performed: 
                                                                      Mu: jk  w  '  j ( 	/,//, LM   
M: jk x w 
To test the null hypothesis (H0), t-test statistic which is the ratio of cross-
sectional mean abnormal returns and their standard deviation (σ) is calculated : 
	jk  jk  wy	jk                              	14 
To test the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return as calculated under 
the three discussed approaches is equal to zero over the event window, the 
hypothesis test is now stated as follows: 
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Mu: jk  0 
M: jk x 0 
The test statistic is therefore, 
	jk   jky	jk                      	15 
If we assume normality assumptions that the mean abnormal returns are 
independent and identically distributed i.e. jk~%n	0, yq	jk , then 	jk  follows 
a t-distribution with   1 degrees of freedom. The numerator in Equation 15 
refers to the average abnormal returns around the event date and the 
denominator is the variance of the abnormal returns over the same period. 
There are various ways of calculating this variance and presented below are the 
approaches used by Thiagarajan and McDonald (2001). These approaches can 
be summarised into parametric and non-parametric approaches. 
Parametric variance calculation approach 
From the normality assumption of independent and identically distributed mean 
abnormal returns, the Central Limit Theorem states that there will be 
convergence to normality as the number of observations increase i.e. 
jk~n	0, yq	jk . The parametric variance is therefore calculated as follows: 
yq	jk   ∑ 	
qQqu jk   4i	 jk q100  1                           	16 
where 
4i	 jk   ∑ 	jk 
qQqu100                                                      	17 
Thiagarajan and McDonald (2001) explain that the above variance cannot be 
used when calculating BHARs, as the variance of BHARs is heteroskedastic i.e. 
time-variant. It must be noted that the above estimates variance over an 
extended estimation window up to the day before the event. The average 
abnormal returns used however, are those estimated over the event window, 
namely 20 days before and after the event. 
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Non-parametric variance calculation approach 
Under this method, the variance of abnormal returns is calculated as follows: 
yq	jk   1nq r	
mC
Q
j,  jk q               	18 
The test statistics is the same as one stated in Equation 15 but based on the 
variances represented by Equation 16 (parametric test) and Equation 18 (non-
parametric test). The above calculations are based on the average abnormal 
returns as calculated in Equation 12. In order to calculate based on the 
cumulative return approach as portrayed in Equation 13, the t-statistics is 
revised as follows for the parametric test using CARs: 
	poooooo  p	, qooooooooooooooooy	j. oooooooo | √~                                           	19 
where 
~  	q   +  1                                                                	20 
Equation 20 represents the total number of event observations used to calculate 
the cumulative abnormal return. The non-parametric approach is similar to that 
presented in Equation 18. Table 4 presents a summary of the tests that will be 
used to test the null hypothesis. 
Table 4: Summary of event study tests 
  
Metric used to test abnormal return and test type 
Average Abnormal Return (AAR)  Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Return Type Parametric Non-parametric Parametric Non-parametric 
Market Adjusted √ √ √ √ 
Market Model √ √ √ √ 
Buy and Hold N/A √ N/A √ 
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Chapter4: Presentation of results 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents results of the event study research and is structured as 
follows. Section 4.2 reports findings on the dividend trend analysis focusing on 
different dividend announcements, no of firms and the nominal size of dividend 
per share. The dividend change model application on the final dividend sample 
consisting of 249 events across 128 companies is presented in Section 4.3 
together with year-on-year frequency of dividend changes. Section 4.4 reports 
final sample’s descriptive statistics of dividend per share (DPS), dividend 
change and dividend yield (DY).  Section 4.5 presents results of the event study 
tests conducted based on the abnormal return performance measures. 
4.2 Dividend analysis and interpretation 
JSE listed companies announce different types of dividends. This is illustrated 
in Table 5 which provides information on the original data sample on dividends.  
Panel A reports the number of dividend events per dividend type and the 
number of firms that made those announcements over the period 2004 to 2009. 
The total number of firms that made dividend announcements over this period is 
313 with a total number of events of 3498. This is before controlling for any 
earnings announcements as described in the sample selection criteria section. 
An upward trend in the total number of dividend events over the period 2004 to 
2008 is observed followed by a marginal decrease in 2009. Similar trend is 
notable for the number of firms making these announcements. It is worth noting 
further, that the relationship between number of announcements and number of 
dividends is not one-to-one. However, Panel A shows that there exists a 
positive relationship between the two.  
Since the primary focus of this research is final cash dividend announcements, 
Panel B shows the number of announcements associated with FC 
announcement over the same period. We observe that the relationship between 
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number of FC announcements and number of firms making FC declarations is 
on average one-to-one. This is not surprising due to the fact that final dividends 
are declared for the financial year end by definition and it is a normal practice 
within the corporate market for FC dividends to be declared once a year. The 
total number of final cash paying companies over the period of study is 307, 
with 1701 total number of dividend announcements before controlling for 
earnings. Dividends in South Africa are declared in South African Cents (ZAC). 
One South African Rand (ZAR) is equivalent to 100 ZAC.  
Panel C shows the sum of dividend per share (DPS) over the period of study.  
Figure 3 shows the trend in DPS for the overall sample (313 firms) and for the 
FC sample (307 firms). In 2009, a significant decline in the overall monetary 
value of DPS (Figure 3, Panel A) is evident. This decline can be attributed to the 
economic conditions resulting from the GFC 2007. A similar trend is observed 
for the final cash dividend sample (Figure 3, Panel B). DPS declined by 44% 
across all dividend types and final cash dividends decreased by 34% (Figure 3, 
Panel C). The final cash DPS over the pre-crisis period, 2004 to 2006, has been 
trending upwards and started to decrease from 2007.  
Table 5: Market and dividend data summary 
 
 
Type Code 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Grand Total
Corporate Action CA 4 2 6 2 1 15
Final Capital Issue FA 1 1 2
Final Cash FC 276 274 286 292 288 285 1701
Final Option FO 2 2 1 1 2 6 14
Interim Capital Issue IA 1 1
Interim Cash IC 223 234 249 268 286 285 1545
Interim Dollar IO 1 4 5
Interim Proforma IQ 19 14 12 9 12 11 77
Special Cash SC 27 31 30 25 13 8 134
Special Option SO 1 1
Special Script SS 1 1 1 3
Grand Total 547 560 581 602 606 602 3498
276 282 295 297 294 294 313No of firms
No of dividend events per year: 2004 -2009Panel A: Dividend Types
Type Code 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Grand Total
Final Cash FC 276 274 286 292 288 285 1701
No of firms N 270 273 284 289 288 284 307
No of dividend events per year: 2004 -2009Panel B: FC
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Figure 3: Announcements, number of firms and dividend per share trend 
 
Type Code 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Grand Total
Corporate Action CA -      -      -      -      -      -       -           
Final Capital Issue FA -      -      -      -      -      0         0              
Final Cash FC 91       116      147      213      222      146      935           
Final Option FO 2         0         0         3         4         8         16            
Interim Capital Issue IA -      -      -      -      -      2         2              
Interim Cash IC 55       91       102      132      170      89        638           
Interim Dollar IO -      -      -      -      1         4         4              
Interim Proforma IQ 4         9         1         1         2         1         19            
Special Cash SC 37       117      50       95       64       8         370           
Special Option SO -      0         -      -      -      -       0              
Special Script SS -      -      1         1         0         -       1              
Grand Total 189      333      300      445      462      257      1,986        
Sum of Dividend Per Share (1ZAR = 100ZAC)Panel C: DPS
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4.3 Dividend change model 
The mathematical description of the dividend change model was introduced in 
Section 3.5.2. Results of the application of this model on the final dividend event 
sample consisting of an unbalanced panel data of 249 events is provided in this 
section. In a nutshell, the model is used to decompose the 249 dividend events 
into events relating to dividend increases, dividend reductions and no change in 
dividends. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the 249 dividend events constitute 150 
dividend increase events, 55 no changes and 44 dividend reduction events.  
Panel B shows the frequency of dividend changes for the final sample of 
dividend events. The number of dividend increases over the pre-crisis period 
(2004 to 2006) is higher than the number of dividend increases during the crisis 
period (2007 – 2009). This implies that fewer companies announced dividend 
increases during the crisis period. Number of dividend decreases on the other 
hand increased during the crisis period which implies more companies 
announced dividend reductions during the economic downturn period. This is 
intuitive as it is expected that during economic downturn periods like the GFC 
2007, company profits tend to be lower compared to normal economic periods. 
Since dividends are paid out of earnings, it is expected that more firms will 
reduce dividends during economic downturns.  
 Figure 4 exhibits the trend explained above and confirms that the frequency of 
dividend increases decreased post 2006, while the frequency of dividend 
decreases increased over the same period. The frequency of no change in 
dividends fluctuated between that of dividend increases and decreases. 
Therefore it can be deduced from the opposite relationship between the 
frequencies of dividend increases and decreases that post 2006, the period that 
marked the beginning of GFC, frequency of dividend increases decreased as 
companies resorted to reducing dividends or keeping them constant. Similar 
trend is observed for the number of dividend events. 
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Table 6: Sample selection and dividend change model 
 
 
 
Panel A: Sample as per the selection criteria Dividend Increases
No 
Change
Dividend
Decreases Total
Total number of dividend events after adjusting for 
missing earnings data 714 240 209 1163
Dividend events which earnings announcements occurs 
within 10 trading days of dividend change announcement 125 54 37 216
Dividend events which earnings announcements are 
made on the same day as dividend announcements 439 131 128 698
Total excluded dividend events 564 185 165 914
Total number of dividend events for analysis 150 55 44 249
Panel B: Frequency of dividend changes per year
Percent. (%) Percent. (%) Percent. (%) Percent. (%)
Number Number Number Number
2004 30 20.00% 12 21.82% 8 18.18% 50 20.08%
2005 29 19.33% 7 12.73% 6 13.64% 42 16.87%
2006 37 24.67% 9 16.36% 3 6.82% 49 19.68%
2007 28 18.67% 8 14.55% 6 13.64% 42 16.87%
2008 17 11.33% 10 18.18% 5 11.36% 32 12.85%
2009 9 6.00% 9 16.36% 16 36.36% 34 13.65%
150 100.00% 55 100.00% 44 100.00% 249 100.00%
Total per YearDividend Increases No Change Dividend Decreases
  
29 
Figure 4: Frequency of dividend changes 
 
 
Table 7 below shows the number of dividend events split according to the pre 
and during crises period for the final dataset. The number of dividend increases 
declined by 44% during the crisis period while the number of dividend reduction 
announcements increased by 59%.  
Table 7: Pre and during crisis number of dividends 
No of dividend events 
Period Dividend Increases No change Decreases 
Pre-crisis 96 28 17 
During crisis 54 27 27 
Total 150 55 44 
% change -43.75% -3.57% 58.82% 
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4.4 Dividend descriptive statistics 
Table 8 (Panel A) reports summary statistics for the final dividend sample 
consisting of 128 JSE listed firms over the study period 2004 to 2009. In 
addition to DPS (dividend per share), an additional variable, dividend yield 
which is calculated by dividing DPS by the share price on the day before 
dividend announcement is included. Below is the expression for calculating 
dividend yield: 
,  c6,c,                                                        	21 
where 
,   %4%% &"% $ $ !   %&  
c6,  %4%% .    $ $ !   %&  
c,     . , $ $ !    %& $  %4%% #,! 
Table 8: Dividend summary statistics 
 
 
Panel A DPS, Cents (ZAC)
Dividend Changes,
ZAC
Dividend 
Yield
Measure
Mean 48.5901 0.2294 0.0253
Median 25.0000 1.9500 0.0237
Std. Deviation 71.8860 42.6598 0.0235
Mean 57.0614 14.1296 0.0325
Median 34.0000 5.5000 0.0300
Std. Deviation 70.4059 24.1709 0.0242
Mean 25.6109 14.1296 0.0325
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Std. Deviation 68.1469 0.0000 0.0214
Mean 49.3620 -43.3120 0.0156
Median 12.0000 -15.0000 0.0139
Std. Deviation 77.6816 64.3690 0.0131
All dividend events (N=249)
Dividend increases (N=150)
No changes (N=55)
Decreases (N=44)
Average Dividend Yield Increase No Change Decrease
2004 2.88% 3.710% 1.680% 2.156%
2005 2.71% 3.298% 1.548% 1.794%
2006 2.14% 2.530% 0.719% 1.236%
2007 2.21% 2.473% 0.911% 1.885%
2008 3.08% 3.915% 0.769% 1.420%
2009 2.94% 5.840% 2.733% 1.163%
Dividend yield per year: 2004 -2009Panel B
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Panel A shows that the mean DPS across all 128 companies is 48.59 cents, 
and dividend change on average is 0.2294 cents with mean dividend yield of 
0.0253. For the dividend decrease sample, the mean dividend yield is lower 
than the mean dividend yield of dividend increases sample. The volatility of 
DPS, change in DPS and dividend yield is high on the dividend reductions 
sample than on the dividend increases sample. Panel B shows the average 
dividend yield trend across all events and also on split samples. Figure 5 shows 
the average dividend yield over the period 2004 to 2009 across all dividend 
events: 
Figure 5: Average dividend yield across all dividend events trend 
 
It is interesting to note the downward trend in mean dividend yield over the pre-
crisis period which was subsequently followed by an upward trend during the 
crisis period. Stock Research Pro (2007) indicates that excessive dividend yield 
is one of the early warning signs to dividend cuts. The authors posit that, while 
every investor wants to achieve the highest yield possible from their 
investments, most companies prefer that their dividend yield be in line with 
historical and industry averages and may consider cutting the dividend to return 
to that balance. The turning point for average dividend yield is in 2006 and post 
this period started increasing until 2008. It appears from Figure 6 that in 2009 
the average yield started trending downwards towards the 2004 levels. This 
supports the argument presented above, that post 2006 companies may have 
cut dividends to return them to the levels they were at before the financial crisis. 
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Average Dividend Yield
  
32 
4.5 Abnormal performance measurement 
This section presents results of abnormal return tests. The objective is to 
assess the market reaction to dividend reductions before and during the 
financial crisis. As previously mentioned, the study period is decomposed into 
two periods. First period, 2004 to 2006 is referred to as pre-crisis period and the 
remaining period, 2007 to 2009, is the crisis period. Dividend changes made 
during the pre-crisis period are considered to be firm-specific changes. 
Changes in dividends made during the financial crisis period are referred to as 
systemic changes. For this analysis, abnormal return tests have been 
conducted and Table 9 reports all tests and metrics used in the analysis. 
Table 9: Abnormal return tests 
  
Metrics used to test abnormal return and test type 
Average Abnormal Return (AAR)  Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Return Type Parametric Non-parametric Parametric Non-parametric 
Market Adjusted X √ X √ 
Market Model X √ X √ 
Buy and Hold N/A √ N/A N/A 
This section is structured as follows. Performance measurement results under 
each approach marked with a √ are presented; starting with test results under 
the average abnormal approach (AAR) followed by cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) approach test results. Under each of these approaches, we test for 
abnormal return significance using cross-sectional or non-parametric tests 
explained in research design section. Due to the small sample size, only non-
parametric tests are conducted. 
Results of the analyses are tabulated according to the abnormal return 
approach and the metric used to test for the significance of the returns thereof. 
Each table has two Panels, Panel A and Panel B. Since non-parametric CAR 
tests are not applicable to the Buy-and-Hold (BHAR) approach, only non-
parametric AAR tests are conducted for BHAR approach. Panel A represents 
average abnormal return approach results and Panel B is the cumulative 
abnormal return approach results.   
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4.5.1 Market Adjusted Abnormal Return 
Findings reported in Table 10 and Table 11 show the average and cumulative 
MAAR test results for the pre-crisis and crisis periods respectively. Formulae for 
calculating the average and cumulative MAAR are presented below.  
/oooooooooo  ∑ /,
mCQ n  	                             p	, q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Results are reported for 10 days before and after the announcement date. For 
full event window (-20, 20) results, see Table 20 in the Appendix. The objective 
is to assess how the market reacts to dividend reductions made before and 
during the financial crisis. Tests are performed at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels.  
Table 10: MAAR pre-crisis (2004 -2006) AAR and CAR test analysis 
 
Results presented for the pre-crisis period (Table 10) show that the average 
MAAR on the day of dividend announcement, day 0, is -0.17% with a t-statistic 
of -0.31. This negative reaction is not statistically significant which could be 
attributable to the fact that the market may have been expecting the reduction 
few days before the announcement. This implies that the dividend 
Day Avg MAAR% t-Statistic Significance 3-day window Cum MAAR % t-Statistic Significance
-10 2.11% 1.36          CAR(-11;-9) 3.20% 1.62            
-9 -0.11% -0.39         CAR(-10;-8) 1.65% 0.95            
-8 -0.35% -1.13         CAR(-9;-7) -0.66% -0.83           
-7 -0.20% -0.34         CAR(-8;-6) -0.97% -1.26           
-6 -0.42% -1.42         CAR(-7;-5) -1.13% -1.55           
-5 -0.51% -2.01         * CAR(-6;-4) -1.01% -1.36           
-4 -0.08% -0.14         CAR(-5;-3) -0.38% -0.44           
-3 0.21% 0.56          CAR(-4;-2) -0.24% -0.29           
-2 -0.36% -1.64         CAR(-3;-1) -0.16% -0.20           
-1 -0.01% -0.02         CAR(-2;0) -0.54% -1.19           
0 -0.17% -0.31         CAR(-1;1) 2.04% 0.86            
1 2.22% 0.88          CAR(0;2) 1.91% 0.82            
2 -0.14% -0.45         CAR(1;3) 1.92% 0.74            
3 -0.16% -0.72         CAR(2;4) -1.10% -1.94           *
4 -0.81% -2.42         ** CAR(3;5) -3.57% -1.87           *
5 -2.61% -1.36         CAR(4;6) -3.81% -1.94           *
6 -0.39% -0.80         CAR(5;7) -3.95% -1.90           *
7 -0.96% -1.68         CAR(6;8) -1.10% -1.69           
8 0.25% 0.51          CAR(7;9) 0.63% 1.36            
9 1.34% 3.37          *** CAR(8;10) 2.09% 2.61            **
10 0.51% 1.45          CAR(9;11) 1.53% 1.62            
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
Market Adjusted Abnormal Return (MAAR)
Pre-crisis period: 2004 - 2006 (N=17)
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announcement carries no surprise to the market. It is also evident from the 
above that the average MAAR is significant on day -5 (10% significance level), 
day 4 (5% significance level) and day 9 (1% significance level). This signifies 
that the market reacts either earlier or later relative to the event date. Upon 
examining the full event window, market reaction is observed most frequently 
on the days prior to the announcement date. Infrequently, the average MAAR is 
positive which means the stock prices react negatively to dividend decreases. 
This supports the notion that stock prices move in the same direction as the 
dividend change. The pre-crisis cumulative abnormal return analysis is based 
on 3-day rolling window analysis. The cumulative MAAR around the event date 
(-1 to +1) is 2.04%. This return is not statistically significant with a t-statistic 
value of 0.86. Frequently, the 3-day cumulative MAAR is negative and not 
statistically significant in the periods before event date. Cumulative returns 
starting from day 2 (2 to 4), (3 to 5) and (4 to 6) are negative and statistically 
significant at 10% significance level signifying negative wealth effects at periods 
later than the event date. None of the cumulative returns are statistically 
significant in all periods prior to the event date (see Table 21 in the Appendix). 
Table 11 below reports the crisis period results.   
Table 11: MAAR crisis (2007-2009) AAR and CAR test analysis 
 
Day Avg MAAR% t-Statistic Significance 3-day window Cum MAAR % t-Statistic Significance
-10 0.87% 1.52          CAR(-11;-9) -0.50% -0.58           
-9 -1.26% -2.19         ** CAR(-10;-8) 0.19% 0.23            
-8 0.59% 1.16          CAR(-9;-7) -0.61% -0.69           
-7 0.07% 0.14          CAR(-8;-6) -0.02% -0.02           
-6 -0.68% -1.34         CAR(-7;-5) 0.38% 0.31            
-5 0.99% 1.20          CAR(-6;-4) -0.18% -0.15           
-4 -0.49% -1.16         CAR(-5;-3) -1.15% -0.75           
-3 -1.65% -1.41         CAR(-4;-2) -0.89% -0.61           
-2 1.25% 1.58          CAR(-3;-1) -0.62% -0.45           
-1 -0.22% -0.27         CAR(-2;0) 0.23% 0.26            
0 -0.80% -1.01         CAR(-1;1) -0.96% -0.86           
1 0.06% 0.13          CAR(0;2) -0.97% -0.76           
2 -0.23% -0.41         CAR(1;3) -0.14% -0.14           
3 0.03% 0.07          CAR(2;4) 0.07% 0.06            
4 0.27% 0.42          CAR(3;5) 1.17% 1.09            
5 0.87% 1.70          CAR(4;6) 1.77% 1.70            
6 0.63% 1.12          CAR(5;7) -0.49% -0.30           
7 -2.00% -1.05         CAR(6;8) -0.77% -0.40           
8 0.59% 1.23          CAR(7;9) -0.65% -0.34           
9 0.76% 1.28          CAR(8;10) 2.21% 2.71            **
10 0.86% 1.43          CAR(9;11) 1.83% 1.99            *
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
Market Adjusted Abnormal Return (MAAR)
Crisis period: 2007 - 2009 (N=27)
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It is interesting to note that during the crisis period, the market reaction based 
on the average MAAR is only significant on day -9. Infrequent statistically 
significant average abnormal returns are observed during the financial crisis 
period. Cumulative returns are significant much later, day 8 to 10 and 9 to 11. 
Comparing the pre-crisis and crisis period abnormal returns reveals that, pre-
crisis reaction is more pronounced than the crisis period reaction. This is 
because the market reacts more when reductions are firm-specific and less 
when the reductions are systemic. This implies that during the crisis period, the 
market expects companies to reduce dividends. Figure 6 below illustrates the 
comparison between pre-crisis and crisis period average MAAR over the 41-day 
event window. The frequency of negative average MAAR during normal 
economic conditions is higher than average MAAR during the crisis period. This 
is evident from Figure 6. This means that stock prices generally react negatively 
to dividend reductions made in normal economic conditions.  
Figure 6: Pre-crisis and crisis average MAAR comparison 
 
Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for the average MAAR for both periods 
of analysis. Findings reported are in line with expectations. The pre-crisis 
minimum average MAAR is -2.61% versus -2% for the crisis period returns.   
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Table 12: Average MAAR event window descriptive statistics 
Average MAAR Event Window Analysis 
Pre-crisis During crisis 
Minimum -2.61% -2.00% 
Maximum 2.22% 1.25% 
Mean 0.01% 0.04% 
Std. Dev 0.82% 0.77% 
Greater than 0 frequency 36.59% 60.98% 
Less than 0 frequency 63.41% 39.02% 
The mean of these average market adjusted returns over the event window is 
lower during the pre-crisis period. Average MAAR is also more volatile in the 
pre-crisis period than the crisis period. More negative average market adjusted 
returns are also observed in the pre-crisis period. Approximately 64% of the 
average MAAR are negative in the pre-crisis period which supports an earlier 
comment about more negative average MAAR being observed during the pre-
crisis period than the crisis period. Moving on to cumulative MAAR comparison 
shows similar results to the average MAAR analysis. 
Figure 7: Pre-crisis and crisis cumulative MAAR comparison 
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Table 13: Cumulative MAAR event window descriptive statistics 
Cumulative MAAR Event Window Analysis 
Pre-crisis During crisis 
Minimum -3.95% -1.83% 
Maximum 3.20% 2.21% 
Mean 0.02% 0.09% 
Std. Dev 1.65% 1.01% 
Greater than 0 frequency 41.03% 46.15% 
Less than 0 frequency 58.97% 53.85% 
The next section discusses results obtained under the single index model, the 
Market Model Abnormal Return (MAAR). 
4.5.2 Market Model Abnormal Return 
Findings reported in Table 14 and Table 15 show the average and cumulative 
MMAR test results for the pre-crisis and crisis periods respectively. Formulae 
for calculating the average and cumulative MMAR are presented below.  
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Table 14: MMAR pre-crisis (2004 - 2006) AAR and CAR test analysis 
 
Day Avg MMAR% t-Statistic Significance 3-day window Cum MMAR % t-Statistic Significance
-10 1.85% 1.16          CAR(-11;-9) 3.11% 1.57          
-9 0.10% 0.34          CAR(-10;-8) 2.00% 1.15          
-8 0.05% 0.14          CAR(-9;-7) 0.41% 0.49          
-7 0.25% 0.49          CAR(-8;-6) 0.22% 0.30          
-6 -0.08% -0.29         CAR(-7;-5) 0.03% 0.04          
-5 -0.15% -0.58         CAR(-6;-4) -0.38% -0.61         
-4 -0.15% -0.25         CAR(-5;-3) -0.05% -0.06         
-3 0.25% 0.82          CAR(-4;-2) 0.50% 0.66          
-2 0.40% 2.44          ** CAR(-3;-1) 0.64% 1.01          
-1 -0.01% -0.01         CAR(-2;0) 0.53% 2.05          *
0 0.14% 0.28          CAR(-1;1) 2.81% 1.12          
1 2.68% 1.08          CAR(0;2) 3.06% 1.20          
2 0.24% 0.83          CAR(1;3) 2.83% 1.12          
3 -0.08% -0.45         CAR(2;4) -0.53% -0.88         
4 -0.68% -1.82         * CAR(3;5) -3.05% -1.68         
5 -2.28% -1.32         CAR(4;6) -2.84% -1.56         
6 0.13% 0.26          CAR(5;7) -2.94% -1.55         
7 -0.78% -1.52         CAR(6;8) -0.38% -0.60         
8 0.28% 0.56          CAR(7;9) 0.37% 0.75          
9 0.88% 2.97          *** CAR(8;10) 1.31% 1.82          *
10 0.16% 0.43          CAR(9;11) 0.42% 0.46          
Market Model Abnormal Return (MMAR)
Pre-crisis period: 2004 - 2006 (N=17)
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
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Results presented in Table 14 shows no market reaction on the day of 
announcement. However on day -2, there is a significant reaction at the 5% 
level. Significant reaction is further observed on day 4 and day 9, result similar 
to average MAAR in the previous section. This reaction is consistent with the 
notion that dividend reductions convey negative information to the market. 
There is no other significant reaction after day 9 which shows that the market 
has adjusted to the dividend reduction. Moving on to cumulative MMAR based 
on 3-day rolling window, it can be seen that there is a significant market 
reaction in the -2 to 0 event window and day 8 to 10 window. There is no 
significant market reaction during the window -1 to 1. There is more market 
reaction to dividend reductions during the crisis period. This is illustrated in 
Table 15 below. 
Table 15: MMAR crisis period (2007-2009) AAR and CAR test analysis 
 
There is no significant market reactions in the periods before the dividend 
announcement since the market could have been expecting such news. 
However, reaction is observed 5 days after the announcement on the average 
MMAR. No reaction is observed for the 10 days prior to announcement on the 
cumulative MMAR. All raw cumulative MMAR returns that are significant are 
positive. Figure 8 shows the comparison of the pre-crisis and crisis period 
Day Avg MMAR% t-Statistic Significance 3-day window Cum MMAR % t-Statistic Significance
-10 1.06% 1.87          * CAR(-11;-9) 0.53% 0.59          
-9 -0.72% -1.07         CAR(-10;-8) 0.82% 0.81          
-8 0.48% 1.02          CAR(-9;-7) -0.36% -0.38         
-7 -0.12% -0.31         CAR(-8;-6) 0.03% 0.04          
-6 -0.33% -0.65         CAR(-7;-5) 0.87% 0.77          
-5 1.32% 1.66          CAR(-6;-4) 0.61% 0.55          
-4 -0.38% -1.20         CAR(-5;-3) -0.63% -0.37         
-3 -1.56% -1.30         CAR(-4;-2) -1.10% -0.68         
-2 0.85% 1.04          CAR(-3;-1) -0.94% -0.68         
-1 -0.23% -0.28         CAR(-2;0) 0.27% 0.32          
0 -0.35% -0.50         CAR(-1;1) -0.31% -0.30         
1 0.26% 0.56          CAR(0;2) -0.40% -0.33         
2 -0.32% -0.59         CAR(1;3) 0.23% 0.24          
3 0.28% 0.78          CAR(2;4) 0.13% 0.15          
4 0.17% 0.30          CAR(3;5) 1.72% 1.84          *
5 1.27% 2.78          *** CAR(4;6) 1.94% 1.96          *
6 0.51% 0.97          CAR(5;7) -0.21% -0.13         
7 -1.99% -1.05         CAR(6;8) -1.05% -0.56         
8 0.43% 1.10          CAR(7;9) -0.41% -0.22         
9 1.15% 2.38          ** CAR(8;10) 2.69% 3.79          ***
10 1.11% 1.94          * CAR(9;11) 2.26% 2.69          **
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
Market Model Abnormal Return (MMAR)
Crisis period: 2007 - 2009 (N=27)
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average MMAR. Interpreted in conjunction with Table 16, it can be seen that the 
pre-crisis negative raw MMAR occur more frequently in the pre-crisis period 
than the crisis period. This outcome compares favourably with the MAAR 
outcome. However, more variation is observed in the crisis period in this case, 
but the difference in variation is marginal. The raw MMAR on the announcement 
day are close to zero for the pre-crisis and crisis periods.  
Figure 8: Pre-crisis and crisis average MMAR comparison 
  
Table 16: Average MMAR event window descriptive statistics 
Average MMAR Event Window Analysis 
Pre-crisis During crisis 
Minimum -2.28% -1.99% 
Maximum 2.68% 1.32% 
Mean 0.11% 0.13% 
Std. Dev 0.74% 0.75% 
Greater than 0 frequency 53.66% 60.98% 
Less than 0 frequency 46.34% 39.02% 
 
Figure 9 shows the 3-day cumulative returns comparison. It can be seen that 
the cumulative return around the dividend announcement date, period -1 to +1, 
is positive before the crisis and negative during the crisis period. 
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Figure 9: Cumulative MMAR event window descriptive statistics 
  
Table 17 shows that the frequency of negative 3 day cumulative MMAR is 
higher during the crisis period than the pre-crisis period. This is consistent with 
the findings of the MMAR analysis. However, the mean cumulative return 
variation is not different between the two crisis periods. During the pre-crisis 
period, the cumulative returns are more volatile than in the crisis period. This is 
also consistent with the finding that the market expects reductions during the 
financial crisis than during normal economic conditions. Thus the news of a 
reduction during the financial crisis does not catch the market by surprise. 
Table 17: Cumulative MMAR event window descriptive statistics 
Cumulative MMAR Event Window Analysis 
Pre-crisis During crisis 
Minimum -3.05% -1.71% 
Maximum 3.11% 2.69% 
Mean 0.33% 0.33% 
Std. Dev 1.46% 1.03% 
Greater than 0 frequency 64.10% 58.97% 
Less than 0 frequency 35.90% 41.03% 
 
The next section concludes the return tests by presenting results of the BHAR 
approach.
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4.5.3 Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return 
Findings reported in Table 18 show the average and cumulative BHAR test 
results for the pre-crisis and crisis periods respectively. Also referred to as the 
characteristic-based matching approach, BHAR formula is presented below.  
LM 	N ? O  P1 + , P	1 + 0,
QO
QN
QO
QN
 
Table 18 shows earlier market reaction on days -7 to 5 for the pre-crisis period. 
The average BHAR over this period is negative which shows that the market 
was expecting bad news in the form of dividend reduction. However, for the 
window surrounding the announcement date, the result is not significant. Few 
days after the announcement significant reaction is observed. For the crisis 
period analysis, no significant reaction before dividend reduction announcement 
was observed. The market was expecting this reduction. There is a significant 
reaction after the announcement for BHAR calculated over day 4 to day 6. 
Table 18: BHAR pre-crisis (2004 – 2006) and crisis (2007 – 2009) AAR test analysis 
 
Figure 10 portrays the comparison of the average BHAR over the event 
window. The results as shown in Table 19 are consistent with the rest of the 
results presented for the MAAR and MMAR tests. 
Avg BHAR% t-Statistic Significance Avg BHAR% t-Statistic Significance
BHAR(-10;-8) 1.35% 0.78          0.16% 0.19            
BHAR(-9;-7) -0.75% -0.96         -0.58% -0.67           
BHAR(-8;-6) -1.10% -1.44         0.01% 0.01            
BHAR(-7;-5) -1.26% -1.76         * 0.43% 0.34            
BHAR(-6;-4) -0.93% -1.29         -0.15% -0.13           
BHAR(-5;-3) 0.04% 0.07          -1.14% -0.75           
BHAR(-4;-2) 0.06% 0.13          -0.86% -0.59           
BHAR(-3;-1) -0.24% -0.29         -0.77% -0.55           
BHAR(-2;0) -0.78% -1.86         * 0.06% 0.07            
BHAR(-1;1) 1.89% 0.79          -0.98% -0.87           
BHAR(0;2) 2.11% 0.91          -0.90% -0.70           
BHAR(1;3) 1.88% 0.73          -0.10% -0.10           
BHAR(2;4) -1.11% -2.47         ** 0.09% 0.08            
BHAR(3;5) -3.20% -1.68         1.20% 1.09            
BHAR(4;6) -3.44% -1.75         * 1.80% 1.71            *
BHAR(5;7) -3.75% -1.82         * -0.70% -0.39           
BHAR(6;8) -0.63% -0.83         -0.87% -0.43           
BHAR(7;9) 0.72% 1.54          -0.70% -0.36           
BHAR(8;10) 1.59% 2.35          ** 2.21% 2.71            **
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
3-day window
Pre-crisis period: 2004 - 2006 (N=17) Crisis period: 2007 - 2009 (N=27)
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR)
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Figure 10: Pre-crisis and crisis period BHAR comparison 
 
 
Table 19: Average BHAR event window descriptive statistics 
Cumulative BHAR Event Window Analysis 
Pre-crisis During crisis 
Minimum -3.75% -1.84% 
Maximum 3.38% 2.21% 
Mean 0.07% 0.08% 
Std. Dev 1.57% 1.02% 
Greater than 0 frequency 51.28% 48.72% 
Less than 0 frequency 48.72% 51.28% 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions and recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the findings and conclusions of the research. Section 
5.2 provides this summary with particular reference to the context in which the 
research objectives were specified. The findings of the research are compared 
and contrasted with findings of published research cited in this research. 
Section 5.3 concludes by making suggestions for future research.  
5.2 Conclusions of the study 
In this research, the analysis of stock market reaction to dividend reductions 
was performed in the context of the South African stock market, the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange. After controlling for the effect of joint 
dividend and earnings announcement, the final sample of companies was 128. 
The selection criteria in other emerging market studies such as Asquith and 
Mullins (2003), Vieira and Raposo (2000) and Dasilas (2004) were applied to 
arrive at the final sample. It was found that majority of JSE listed companies 
make joint dividend and earnings announcements i.e. announce dividend and 
earnings announcements on the same day. To control for the confounding 
effects of earnings, joint announcement events were eliminated. This resulted in 
an unbalanced panel data of 249 events. These events span the study period 
2004 to 2009 which was decomposed into pre-crisis period (2004 to 2006) and 
crisis period (2007 to 2009).  
Abnormal return approaches were used to analyse how the market reacted to 
dividend reductions if the reduction is made prior to the crisis and during the 
crisis. Results of the analysis show that there is no significant market reaction 
on the day that the dividend reduction is announced across all measures of 
abnormal performance around the event date. In a similar study performed in 
the Greek market, Dasilas (2004) posits that there is a statistically significant 
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market reaction on the dividend announcement day. This is not in line with the 
empirical findings of this research. However results of the market adjusted 
abnormal return show that the early significant market reaction is 5 days prior to 
the announcement and 4 days after the announcement before the financial 
crisis. In both instances the reaction is negative as evidenced by negative 
abnormal returns. For the crisis period, findings show that the early reaction is 9 
days prior to the announcement and 14 days after the announcement. The 
market reaction is negative too for the crisis period. This outcome tends to 
support the notion that dividend reductions convey negative information to the 
public which results in a subsequent fall in stock price. This negative reaction 
persisted for few days after the announcement. In terms of the frequency of 
negative returns, the study found that more negative returns are observed 
before the crisis period than during the crisis period. This shows that the stock 
market sees dividend reductions during normal economic conditions more often 
as bad news than reductions induced during crisis period.  
The analysis of market model abnormal returns show that market reaction 
occurs later in comparison to the market adjusted abnormal return case as 
described above. Prior to the crisis, statistically significant reaction is observed 
2 days prior to announcement date. Recall that the MAAR reaction was 5 days. 
The statistically not significant results show that the markets are efficient and 
adjust quickly to announcement information. During the crisis period, significant 
reaction is observed 10 days prior to announcement then 5 days after the 
announcement. The frequency of negative MMAR raw returns is higher during 
the crisis. 
The analysis of the BHAR reveals no statistical significance on the 
announcement day. Similar to the cumulative abnormal returns, measured over 
a 3 day window, more significant market reaction is observed in the periods 
after the announcement during the crisis period. This measure yields positive 
raw returns despite the dividend reduction.  
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Analysing the volatility of abnormal returns shows that the abnormal returns 
before the financial crisis are more volatile than abnormal returns during the 
crisis period.  
Since this study is the first attempt to gauge JSE listed firm’s reaction to 
dividend reductions over the pre and during crisis periods, more research needs 
to start forthcoming going forward. Based on a small sample data due to the 
nature of dividend announcement practice in South Africa, results presented in 
this report do contribute towards understanding the effects of firm-specific and 
systemic related dividend reductions. From the findings it was also shown that 
the abnormal return volatility is higher in the pre-crisis period.  
In conclusion, the research indicates that there is no statistically significant 
market reaction on the dividend announcement day. The market reaction 
observed after the announcement date implies that dividend reductions affect 
firm stock prices, consequently shareholder value. It can therefore be concluded 
that the findings of this research do not seem to support the Irrelevance Theory.  
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
Future studies conducted in the context of the South African market should be 
directed towards the following. The research found that controlling for 
confounding effects of joint dividend and earnings announcements resulted in a 
small sample for a comprehensive analysis. The joint effect has to be separated 
by analysing interactions or relationship between earnings change and dividend 
change. This is likely to increase the sample size and thus improve on the 
results. The main focus of the research was on market’s reaction to final cash 
dividend reductions. Interim and special cash dividend analysis is left for future 
research since these types of corporate actions are also significant (total DPS) 
in South Africa. Application of the dividend change model can be used to 
determine how the market reacts to increases in dividends during the two 
periods of comparison. 
  
46 
References 
Araujo, A., Moreira, H. and Tsuchida, H. (2004) Do dividends signal more 
earnings? 
Asquith, P. and Mullins, D. (1983) The impact of initiating dividend payments on 
shareholder’s wealth, Journal of Business, 15, p. 77-96 
Azhagaiah, R. and Sabari Priya, N. (2008) The Impact of Dividend Policy on 
Shareholders’ Wealth, International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 20, p. 180 -187 
Bhana, N. (1998) The share price reaction on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange for special (extra) dividend announcements, Investment Analyst 
Journal, 47, 1998 
Bhattacharya, S. (1979) Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and “The Bird in 
the Hand Fallacy”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 259 - 270 
Dasilas, A. (2004) Stock market reaction to dividend announcements: Evidence 
from the Greek Stock Market 
Denis, D. and Osobov, I. (2007) Why Do Firms Pay Dividends? International 
Evidence on the Determinants of Dividend Policy 
Firer, C., Ross, S.A., Westerfield, R.W. and Jordan, B.D. (2008), Fundamentals 
of Corporate Finance, 4th South African Edition, ch17 p. 543-573 
Fuller, K. and Goldstein, M. (2003) Dividend Policy and Market Movements 
Hirvonen, J. (2009) Abnormal stock performance induced by the establishing of 
Russian operations: An event study on a portfolio of Finnish companies 
Kalay, A. Signaling, Information Content, and the Reluctance to Cut Dividends, 
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 855-869. 
  
47 
Khotari, S.P. and Warner, J.B (2006) Econometrics of Event Studies 
Miller, M.H. and Modigliani, F. (1961) Dividend Policy, Growth and Valuation of 
Shares,Journal of Business, 34, 1961, p.411-433 
Pradhan, R. (2003) Effects of Dividends on Common Stock Prices: The 
Nepalese Evidence 
Ravi, L. and Sirikiat, R. (2007) Complete Dividend Signal 
Sealy, R. and Knight, R.F. (1987) Dividend Policy, share price and return: A 
study on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, The Investment Analyst Journal, 
p.33 -47 
Shulian Liu, Yanhong Hu, (2005,) Empirical Analysis of Cash Dividend Payment 
in Chinese Listed Companies, Nature and Science 
Stock Research Pro, (2009) The Warning Signs and Impact of a Dividend Cut 
Thiagarajan, R. and McDonald, B. (2001) Buy, Sell or Hold? An event study 
analysis of significant day losses in equity value 
Thirumalvalavan, P. and Sunitha, P. (2006) Share price behaviour around buy 
back and dividend announcements in India 
Travlos, N., Trigeorgis, L. and Vafeas, N. (2001) Shareholder Wealth Effects of 
Dividend Policy: Changes in an Emerging Stock Market: The Case of Cyprus, 
Multinational Finance Journal, 5, p.87-112 
Uddin, H. (2003) Effect of Dividend Announcement on Shareholder’s Value: 
Evidence from Dhaka Stock Exchange, 22 November 2003 
Vieira, E. and Raposo, C. (2000) Signalling with dividends? The signalling effect 
of dividend change announcements: new evidence from Europe 
Wolmarans, H.P. (2003) Does Lintner’s dividend model explain South African 
dividend payments?, Meditari Accountancy Research, 11, 2003, p. 243–254 
  
48 
  
  
49 
Appendix 
Table 20: MAAR pre-crisis average and cumulative return analysis 
 
  
Day Avg MAAR% t-Statistic Significance 3-day window Cum MAAR % t-Statistic Significance
-20 -0.20% -0.83         
-19 -0.40% -1.08         CAR(-20;-18) -1.03% -1.50           
-18 -0.43% -1.04         CAR(-19;-17) -0.16% -0.17           
-17 0.67% 0.99          CAR(-18;-16) -0.42% -0.41           
-16 -0.66% -1.37         CAR(-17;-15) -0.29% -0.32           
-15 -0.30% -0.84         CAR(-16;-14) -0.54% -0.39           
-14 0.42% 0.39          CAR(-15;-13) 0.70% 0.99            
-13 0.58% 0.70          CAR(-14;-12) 0.80% 1.11            
-12 -0.19% -0.88         CAR(-13;-11) 1.59% 0.96            
-11 1.20% 1.28          CAR(-12;-10) 3.12% 1.61            
-10 2.11% 1.36          CAR(-11;-9) 3.20% 1.62            
-9 -0.11% -0.39         CAR(-10;-8) 1.65% 0.95            
-8 -0.35% -1.13         CAR(-9;-7) -0.66% -0.83           
-7 -0.20% -0.34         CAR(-8;-6) -0.97% -1.26           
-6 -0.42% -1.42         CAR(-7;-5) -1.13% -1.55           
-5 -0.51% -2.01         * CAR(-6;-4) -1.01% -1.36           
-4 -0.08% -0.14         CAR(-5;-3) -0.38% -0.44           
-3 0.21% 0.56          CAR(-4;-2) -0.24% -0.29           
-2 -0.36% -1.64         CAR(-3;-1) -0.16% -0.20           
-1 -0.01% -0.02         CAR(-2;0) -0.54% -1.19           
0 -0.17% -0.31         CAR(-1;1) 2.04% 0.86            
1 2.22% 0.88          CAR(0;2) 1.91% 0.82            
2 -0.14% -0.45         CAR(1;3) 1.92% 0.74            
3 -0.16% -0.72         CAR(2;4) -1.10% -1.94           *
4 -0.81% -2.42         ** CAR(3;5) -3.57% -1.87           *
5 -2.61% -1.36         CAR(4;6) -3.81% -1.94           *
6 -0.39% -0.80         CAR(5;7) -3.95% -1.90           *
7 -0.96% -1.68         CAR(6;8) -1.10% -1.69           
8 0.25% 0.51          CAR(7;9) 0.63% 1.36            
9 1.34% 3.37          *** CAR(8;10) 2.09% 2.61            **
10 0.51% 1.45          CAR(9;11) 1.53% 1.62            
11 -0.32% -0.47         CAR(10;12) 0.13% 0.16            
12 -0.06% -0.12         CAR(11;13) -1.50% -2.03           *
13 -1.12% -2.32         ** CAR(12;14) -0.66% -1.94           *
14 0.52% 1.38          CAR(13;15) -0.04% -0.07           
15 0.55% 2.28          ** CAR(14;16) 1.49% 2.03            *
16 0.41% 0.68          CAR(15;17) 1.25% 1.33            
17 0.28% 0.85          CAR(16;18) 0.32% 0.38            
18 -0.37% -1.16         CAR(17;19) -0.39% -0.73           
19 -0.31% -0.98         CAR(18;20) -0.07% -0.09           
20 0.60% 1.28          
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
Market Adjusted Abnormal Return (MAAR)
Pre-crisis period: 2004 - 2006 (N=17)
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Table 21: MAAR crisis period average and cumulative return analysis 
 
  
Day Avg MAAR% t-Statistic Significance 3-day window Cum MAAR % t-Statistic Significance
-20 0.33% 0.67          
-19 0.86% 1.44          CAR(-20;-18) 0.42% 0.53            
-18 -0.77% -1.86         * CAR(-19;-17) 1.22% 1.47            
-17 1.13% 2.55          ** CAR(-18;-16) 0.70% 0.79            
-16 0.34% 0.69          CAR(-17;-15) 1.63% 1.76            *
-15 0.16% 0.32          CAR(-16;-14) -0.57% -0.74           
-14 -1.07% -2.10         ** CAR(-15;-13) -1.15% -1.47           
-13 -0.24% -0.54         CAR(-14;-12) -1.04% -1.17           
-12 0.28% 0.60          CAR(-13;-11) -0.07% -0.11           
-11 -0.10% -0.25         CAR(-12;-10) 1.04% 1.18            
-10 0.87% 1.52          CAR(-11;-9) -0.50% -0.58           
-9 -1.26% -2.19         ** CAR(-10;-8) 0.19% 0.23            
-8 0.59% 1.16          CAR(-9;-7) -0.61% -0.69           
-7 0.07% 0.14          CAR(-8;-6) -0.02% -0.02           
-6 -0.68% -1.34         CAR(-7;-5) 0.38% 0.31            
-5 0.99% 1.20          CAR(-6;-4) -0.18% -0.15           
-4 -0.49% -1.16         CAR(-5;-3) -1.15% -0.75           
-3 -1.65% -1.41         CAR(-4;-2) -0.89% -0.61           
-2 1.25% 1.58          CAR(-3;-1) -0.62% -0.45           
-1 -0.22% -0.27         CAR(-2;0) 0.23% 0.26            
0 -0.80% -1.01         CAR(-1;1) -0.96% -0.86           
1 0.06% 0.13          CAR(0;2) -0.97% -0.76           
2 -0.23% -0.41         CAR(1;3) -0.14% -0.14           
3 0.03% 0.07          CAR(2;4) 0.07% 0.06            
4 0.27% 0.42          CAR(3;5) 1.17% 1.09            
5 0.87% 1.70          CAR(4;6) 1.77% 1.70            
6 0.63% 1.12          CAR(5;7) -0.49% -0.30           
7 -2.00% -1.05         CAR(6;8) -0.77% -0.40           
8 0.59% 1.23          CAR(7;9) -0.65% -0.34           
9 0.76% 1.28          CAR(8;10) 2.21% 2.71            **
10 0.86% 1.43          CAR(9;11) 1.83% 1.99            *
11 0.21% 0.50          CAR(10;12) 0.98% 1.16            
12 -0.10% -0.18         CAR(11;13) -0.20% -0.20           
13 -0.31% -0.81         CAR(12;14) -1.83% -1.96           *
14 -1.43% -2.23         ** CAR(13;15) -1.38% -1.41           
15 0.35% 0.54          CAR(14;16) -0.20% -0.20           
16 0.87% 2.19          ** CAR(15;17) 1.39% 1.85            *
17 0.17% 0.38          CAR(16;18) 1.16% 1.07            
18 0.12% 0.17          CAR(17;19) 0.89% 0.90            
19 0.61% 1.19          CAR(18;20) 0.64% 0.73            
20 -0.08% -0.25         
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
Market Adjusted Abnormal Return (MAAR)
Crisis period: 2007 - 2009 (N=27)
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Table 22: MMAR pre-crisis period average and cumulative return analysis 
 
  
Day Avg MMAR% t-Statistic Significance 3-day window Cum MMAR % t-Statistic Significance
-20 -0.32% -1.34         
-19 -0.01% -0.04         CAR(-20;-18) -0.45% -0.75         
-18 -0.11% -0.29         CAR(-19;-17) 0.59% 0.68          
-17 0.71% 1.09          CAR(-18;-16) 0.07% 0.07          
-16 -0.53% -0.93         CAR(-17;-15) -0.14% -0.14         
-15 -0.32% -1.00         CAR(-16;-14) -0.89% -0.56         
-14 -0.04% -0.04         CAR(-15;-13) 0.09% 0.14          
-13 0.45% 0.51          CAR(-14;-12) 0.31% 0.49          
-12 -0.10% -0.54         CAR(-13;-11) 1.51% 0.93          
-11 1.16% 1.29          CAR(-12;-10) 2.90% 1.47          
-10 1.85% 1.16          CAR(-11;-9) 3.11% 1.57          
-9 0.10% 0.34          CAR(-10;-8) 2.00% 1.15          
-8 0.05% 0.14          CAR(-9;-7) 0.41% 0.49          
-7 0.25% 0.49          CAR(-8;-6) 0.22% 0.30          
-6 -0.08% -0.29         CAR(-7;-5) 0.03% 0.04          
-5 -0.15% -0.58         CAR(-6;-4) -0.38% -0.61         
-4 -0.15% -0.25         CAR(-5;-3) -0.05% -0.06         
-3 0.25% 0.82          CAR(-4;-2) 0.50% 0.66          
-2 0.40% 2.44          ** CAR(-3;-1) 0.64% 1.01          
-1 -0.01% -0.01         CAR(-2;0) 0.53% 2.05          *
0 0.14% 0.28          CAR(-1;1) 2.81% 1.12          
1 2.68% 1.08          CAR(0;2) 3.06% 1.20          
2 0.24% 0.83          CAR(1;3) 2.83% 1.12          
3 -0.08% -0.45         CAR(2;4) -0.53% -0.88         
4 -0.68% -1.82         * CAR(3;5) -3.05% -1.68         
5 -2.28% -1.32         CAR(4;6) -2.84% -1.56         
6 0.13% 0.26          CAR(5;7) -2.94% -1.55         
7 -0.78% -1.52         CAR(6;8) -0.38% -0.60         
8 0.28% 0.56          CAR(7;9) 0.37% 0.75          
9 0.88% 2.97          *** CAR(8;10) 1.31% 1.82          *
10 0.16% 0.43          CAR(9;11) 0.42% 0.46          
11 -0.62% -0.86         CAR(10;12) -0.42% -0.48         
12 0.04% 0.07          CAR(11;13) -1.19% -1.64         
13 -0.62% -1.18         CAR(12;14) -0.31% -1.00         
14 0.27% 0.89          CAR(13;15) -0.31% -0.43         
15 0.04% 0.19          CAR(14;16) 0.90% 1.15          
16 0.59% 0.88          CAR(15;17) 0.88% 0.98          
17 0.25% 0.84          CAR(16;18) 0.82% 0.96          
18 -0.03% -0.16         CAR(17;19) 0.19% 0.38          
19 -0.04% -0.13         CAR(18;20) 0.35% 0.61          
20 0.41% 0.98          
Market Model Abnormal Return (MMAR)
Pre-crisis period: 2004 - 2006 (N=17)
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
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Table 23: MMAR crisis period average and cumulative return analysis 
 
  
Day Avg MMAR% t-Statistic Significance 3-day window Cum MMAR % t-Statistic Significance
-20 0.60% 1.22          
-19 1.07% 2.16          ** CAR(-20;-18) 1.22% 1.60          
-18 -0.45% -1.09         CAR(-19;-17) 1.43% 1.74          *
-17 0.81% 1.79          * CAR(-18;-16) 0.92% 1.18          
-16 0.56% 1.29          CAR(-17;-15) 1.56% 1.76          *
-15 0.19% 0.42          CAR(-16;-14) -0.02% -0.03         
-14 -0.77% -1.63         CAR(-15;-13) -0.79% -1.06         
-13 -0.21% -0.53         CAR(-14;-12) -0.47% -0.50         
-12 0.52% 1.04          CAR(-13;-11) 0.50% 0.79          
-11 0.19% 0.62          CAR(-12;-10) 1.77% 2.16          **
-10 1.06% 1.87          * CAR(-11;-9) 0.53% 0.59          
-9 -0.72% -1.07         CAR(-10;-8) 0.82% 0.81          
-8 0.48% 1.02          CAR(-9;-7) -0.36% -0.38         
-7 -0.12% -0.31         CAR(-8;-6) 0.03% 0.04          
-6 -0.33% -0.65         CAR(-7;-5) 0.87% 0.77          
-5 1.32% 1.66          CAR(-6;-4) 0.61% 0.55          
-4 -0.38% -1.20         CAR(-5;-3) -0.63% -0.37         
-3 -1.56% -1.30         CAR(-4;-2) -1.10% -0.68         
-2 0.85% 1.04          CAR(-3;-1) -0.94% -0.68         
-1 -0.23% -0.28         CAR(-2;0) 0.27% 0.32          
0 -0.35% -0.50         CAR(-1;1) -0.31% -0.30         
1 0.26% 0.56          CAR(0;2) -0.40% -0.33         
2 -0.32% -0.59         CAR(1;3) 0.23% 0.24          
3 0.28% 0.78          CAR(2;4) 0.13% 0.15          
4 0.17% 0.30          CAR(3;5) 1.72% 1.84          *
5 1.27% 2.78          *** CAR(4;6) 1.94% 1.96          *
6 0.51% 0.97          CAR(5;7) -0.21% -0.13         
7 -1.99% -1.05         CAR(6;8) -1.05% -0.56         
8 0.43% 1.10          CAR(7;9) -0.41% -0.22         
9 1.15% 2.38          ** CAR(8;10) 2.69% 3.79          ***
10 1.11% 1.94          * CAR(9;11) 2.26% 2.69          **
11 0.01% 0.02          CAR(10;12) 1.12% 1.47          
12 0.01% 0.01          CAR(11;13) -0.34% -0.37         
13 -0.35% -1.01         CAR(12;14) -1.71% -1.89         *
14 -1.36% -2.20         ** CAR(13;15) -1.41% -1.45         
15 0.30% 0.46          CAR(14;16) -0.30% -0.31         
16 0.76% 2.31          ** CAR(15;17) 0.99% 1.29          
17 -0.07% -0.18         CAR(16;18) 0.47% 0.54          
18 -0.22% -0.34         CAR(17;19) 0.51% 0.59          
19 0.79% 1.70          CAR(18;20) 0.64% 0.76          
20 0.07% 0.25          
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
Market Model Abnormal Return (MMAR)
Crisis period: 2007 - 2009 (N=27)
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Table 24: BHAR pre-crisis and crisis period average and cumulative return analysis 
 
Avg BHAR% t-Statistic Significance Avg BHAR% t-Statistic Significance
BHAR(-20;-18) -1.04% -1.67         0.41% 0.51            
BHAR(-19;-17) -0.28% -0.32         1.24% 1.49            
BHAR(-18;-16) -0.81% -0.96         0.70% 0.79            
BHAR(-17;-15) -0.52% -0.68         1.62% 1.75            *
BHAR(-16;-14) -0.40% -0.31         -0.56% -0.73           
BHAR(-15;-13) 0.58% 0.83          -1.15% -1.50           
BHAR(-14;-12) 0.74% 1.04          -1.04% -1.18           
BHAR(-13;-11) 1.77% 1.03          -0.07% -0.11           
BHAR(-12;-10) 3.38% 1.75          1.06% 1.18            
BHAR(-11;-9) 3.20% 1.61          -0.53% -0.63           
BHAR(-10;-8) 1.35% 0.78          0.16% 0.19            
BHAR(-9;-7) -0.75% -0.96         -0.58% -0.67           
BHAR(-8;-6) -1.10% -1.44         0.01% 0.01            
BHAR(-7;-5) -1.26% -1.76         * 0.43% 0.34            
BHAR(-6;-4) -0.93% -1.29         -0.15% -0.13           
BHAR(-5;-3) 0.04% 0.07          -1.14% -0.75           
BHAR(-4;-2) 0.06% 0.13          -0.86% -0.59           
BHAR(-3;-1) -0.24% -0.29         -0.77% -0.55           
BHAR(-2;0) -0.78% -1.86         * 0.06% 0.07            
BHAR(-1;1) 1.89% 0.79          -0.98% -0.87           
BHAR(0;2) 2.11% 0.91          -0.90% -0.70           
BHAR(1;3) 1.88% 0.73          -0.10% -0.10           
BHAR(2;4) -1.11% -2.47         ** 0.09% 0.08            
BHAR(3;5) -3.20% -1.68         1.20% 1.09            
BHAR(4;6) -3.44% -1.75         * 1.80% 1.71            *
BHAR(5;7) -3.75% -1.82         * -0.70% -0.39           
BHAR(6;8) -0.63% -0.83         -0.87% -0.43           
BHAR(7;9) 0.72% 1.54          -0.70% -0.36           
BHAR(8;10) 1.59% 2.35          ** 2.21% 2.71            **
BHAR(9;11) 1.28% 1.30          1.85% 1.98            *
BHAR(10;12) 0.38% 0.55          0.99% 1.17            
BHAR(11;13) -1.02% -1.79         * -0.19% -0.19           
BHAR(12;14) -0.25% -0.72         -1.84% -1.94           *
BHAR(13;15) 0.29% 0.53          -1.39% -1.40           
BHAR(14;16) 1.58% 2.22          ** -0.21% -0.22           
BHAR(15;17) 1.25% 1.33          1.41% 1.86            *
BHAR(16;18) 0.23% 0.26          1.16% 1.08            
BHAR(17;19) -0.24% -0.47         0.90% 0.93            
BHAR(18;20) 0.30% 0.41          0.64% 0.72            
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR)
Average abnormal return cross-sectional test
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.01 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, * statistically significant at 0.1 level
3-day window
Pre-crisis period: 2004 - 2006 (N=17) Crisis period: 2007 - 2009 (N=27)
